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MODAL EXTENSIONS OF ŁUKASIEWICZ LOGIC
FOR MODELING COALITIONAL POWER
TOMÁŠ KROUPA AND BRUNO TEHEUX
Abstract. Modal logics for reasoning about the power of coalitions capture
the notion of effectivity functions associated with game forms. The main
goal of coalition logics is to provide formal tools for modeling the dynam-
ics of a game frame whose states may correspond to different game forms.
The two classes of effectivity functions studied are the families of playable
and truly playable effectivity functions, respectively. In this paper we gener-
alize the concept of effectivity function beyond the yes/no truth scale. This
enables us to describe the situations in which the coalitions assess their effec-
tivity in degrees, based on functions over the outcomes taking values in a finite
Łukasiewicz chain. Then we introduce two modal extensions of Łukasiewicz
finite-valued logic together with many-valued neighborhood semantics in order
to encode the properties of many-valued effectivity functions associated with
game forms. As our main results we prove completeness theorems for the two
newly introduced modal logics.
1. Introduction
Modeling collective actions of agents and capturing their effectivity is among the
important research topics on the frontiers of game theory, computer science and
mathematical logic. The main efforts are concentrated on answering the following
question: what is the set of outcome states that can effectively be implemented by
a coalition of agents? A game-theoretic framework for studying collective actions
and their enforceability is based on the notion of game forms. Loosely speaking,
a game form is a pure description of a game and its rules, without regard to the
agents’ preferences. Game frames enable us to capture a more general action model
in which a game form is associated with every state of the frame and the outcome
states of the game forms are the states of the frame. From the game-theoretic
viewpoint, the game frames are extensive form games with simultaneous moves
of the players; see [18, 23].
The concept of α-effectivity ([1, 21]) is one of the key approaches to characterize
the coalitional effectivity within game form models. A coalition C is α-effective for
a set of outcome statesX if the players in C can choose a joint strategy that enforces
an outcome in X no matter what strategies are adopted by the other players. The
previous definition gives rise to the concept of a (truly) playable effectivity function.
In his seminal paper [20], Pauly introduces Coalition Logic CLN to reason about
α-effectivity in game forms with player set N . The axiomatization of CLN is
an attempt to characterize the class of α-effectivity functions in a multi-modal
language. Pauly also defined a neighborhood semantics with respect to which CLN
is complete. The logic CLN was subsequently analyzed and extended by many
authors; see [2, 6]. In particular, Goranko et al. [10] found a gap in Pauly’s
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characterization of playable effectivity functions (see [20, Theorem 3.2]), which led
to the introduction of truly playable effectivity functions.1 The reader is invited
to consult Section 2 together with Appendix A, where we recall all the necessary
notions regarding Boolean effectivity functions and the distinction between playable
and truly playable functions, respectively.
In this paper we extend the results of Pauly [20] and Goranko et al. [10] to the
situations in which the effectivity of coalitions is evaluated on a finer finite scale
than {0, 1}. This generalization is based on several assumptions. First, we assume
that coalitions evaluate their effectivity with respect to a certain family of [0, 1]-
valued functions over the state space and not only with respect to the sets of states.
Second, the effectivity of coalitions comes in degrees rather than in Boolean values.
Third, the underlying logical framework is that of finitely-valued Łukasiewicz logic,
which offers a great expressive power, while preserving many desirable properties
of logics at the same time.
Our main goal is to investigate the properties of many-valued modal logics Pn
and TPn devised for capturing the refined notion of effectivity. To this end, we
proceed as follows. In Section 3 we generalize the notion of α-effectivity. Since we
use finitely-valued Łukasiewicz logic, our scale is always the set
(1.1) Łn =
{
0, 1n , . . . ,
n−1
n , 1
}
, where n is a positive integer.2
The choice of Łukasiewicz logic is not only a design choice that is suitable for
applying the usual operations of MV-algebras to the Łn-valued functions over the
state space, but also a matter of practical necessity since the homogeneity property
(Definition 4.2) is among the key features of (playable) many-valued effectivity
functions. On the logical side it corresponds to the axioms (1)–(2) of the logic Pn
in Definition 5.9. It is worth mentioning that homogeneity appears as an axiom in
other modal languages as well; see [7, 19, 22]. The finiteness of our scale of truth
degrees is essential for the completeness results, which usually fail badly for modal
extensions of infinitely-valued Łukasiewicz logic [13].
We introduce the concept of Łn-valued effectivity function whose purpose is to
capture the effectivity of coalitions on the scale Łn. In order to understand the rela-
tion between effectivity functions and game forms, we have to consider the class of
playable and truly playable Łn-valued effectivity functions, respectively, which are
studied in Section 4. In particular, we establish a characterization of truly playable
Łn-valued effectivity functions (Theorem 4.9). In Section 5, we develop tools to
capture the properties of Łn-valued effectivity functions in a many-valued modal
language. These developments rely not only on recent advances in modal extensions
of Łukasiewicz logic (see [7, 13]), but they also require the introduction of neighbor-
hood semantics, which has never been considered in the modal many-valued setting
before, to the best of our knowledge. The newly introduced logics Pn and TPn
axiomatize in the many-valued modal language the properties of playable and truly
playable Łn-valued effectivity functions, respectively. Our main results are Theo-
rem 5.18 and Theorem 5.29, which show that the logics Pn and TPn are complete
with respect to the corresponding classes of Łn-valued coalitional frames. The key
ingredient in the proof of completeness of TPn is the many-valued generalization
of the filtration technique for neighborhood models [8, Chapter 7.5]. These mathe-
matical constructions have their own merit and are among the main contributions
of the paper, since they provide a “bag of tricks” that could be reused to develop
neighborhood semantics for other modal extensions of finite-valued Łukasiewicz
logics.
1We are grateful to Paolo Turrini who brought the paper [10] to our attention.
2Our notation for Łn as a set of cardinality n+ 1 follows [17].
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2. Game forms and effectivity functions
We recall basic facts about game forms and effectivity functions; see [1]. In what
follows, S denotes a nonempty set, N = {1, . . . , k} is a finite set and, for any i ∈ N ,
Σi denotes a nonempty set. For any set Ω we denote by PΩ the powerset of Ω.
Definition 2.1 ([1, Definition 3.1]). A (strategic) game form is a tuple G =
(N, {Σi | i ∈ N}, S, o), where N is a set of players, Σi is a set of strategies for
each i ∈ N , S is a set of outcome states, and o :
∏
i∈N Σi → S is an outcome
function.
The game forms are not to be confused with strategic games. While a preference
relation over S must be defined for each player i ∈ N in a strategic game [18],
no such requirement exists for a game form. Below we provide some basic examples
of game forms.
Example 2.2. (i) Let N = {1, 2} and Σ1, Σ2 be some strategy sets. Assume that
the players choose their strategies simultaneously. Then we may set S = Σ1 × Σ2
and define o as the identity function, which turns ({1, 2}, {Σ1,Σ2},Σ1 × Σ2, o)
into a game form. This game form just records an outcome as the pair of chosen
strategies. (ii) Suppose, on the other hand, that Player 2 makes his choice only after
observing the strategic choice of Player 1. This sequential procedure is modeled
by a game form such that Σ2 is the set of all functions r : Σ1 → Σ
′
2, where Σ
′
2
can be viewed as the set of all possible moves that can be played by Player 2.
Hence, Σ2 models the replies of Player 2 to the selection of a strategy by Player 1.
The outcome function is given by o(σ1, r) = (σ1, r(σ1)), where (σ1, r) ∈ Σ1 × Σ2
and the set of outcome states is S = Σ1 × Σ
′
2.
An important example arises when the outcome function coincides with some
social choice correspondence in the sense of [1, Chapter 1].
Example 2.3. Let S′ be any nonempty set of outcome states and Π(S′) be a set
of admissible preference relations on S′. In most applications, Π(S′) will be either
the set of total preorders (reflexive, transitive, and complete binary relations) or
the set of linear orders. A map π : Π(S′)N → PS′ is called a social choice corre-
spondence. Social choice correspondences implement collective decision procedures
mapping a preference profile σ ∈ Π(S′)N of the agents into a set of outcome states
that are considered equivalent with respect to σ. If an agent (or a group of agents)
wants to enforce a specific outcome, his/her only possible strategy is to declare
a preference relation that is likely to bring the collective decision into an outcome
π(σ) that contains the desired state. We can describe this scheme as a game form
G = (N, {Σi | i ∈ N}, S, o) in which Σ1 = · · · = Σk = Π(S
′), S = PS′ and o = π.
The subsets C ⊆ N are called coalitions. For every coalition C we denote by C
its set-complement in N . If σC ∈
∏
i∈C Σi and σC ∈
∏
i∈C Σi, then σCσC is the
strategy tuple in
∏
i∈N Σi defined by (σCσC)i = (σC)i if i ∈ C and (σCσC)i = (σC)i
if i ∈ C.
Definition 2.4 ([1, Definition 4.1]). Let G be a game form. The effectivity function
of G is the mapping HG : PN → PPS defined as follows: X ∈ HG(C) if there exists
σC such that for every σC , we have o(σCσC) ∈ X .
In other words, the condition X ∈ HG(C) is true whenever the coalition C has
the power to force the outcome to lie in X . We refer to [1, 20, 21] for a discussion
and examples of effectivity functions in game theory and social choice.
The notion of effectivity function of a game form can be generalized as follows.
Definition 2.5. A mapping E : PN → PPS is called an effectivity function.
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The problem of characterizing effectivity functions that are effectivity functions of
game forms is solved by introducing the notion of true playability. It was used by
Goranko et al. [10] in order to fix the error in Pauly’s characterization result [20,
Theorem 3.2], which was based on the weaker notion of playability. We recall the
two playability concepts in the next definition.
Definition 2.6. Let E : PN → PPS be an effectivity function. We say that E
(1) is superadditive if C1 ∩ C2 = ∅ and X ∈ E(C1), Y ∈ E(C2) imply that
X ∩ Y ∈ E(C1 ∪C2), for every C1, C2 ∈ PN ;
(2) is outcome monotonic if X ∈ E(C) and X ⊆ Y imply Y ∈ E(C), for every
C ∈ PN ;
(3) is N -maximal if X /∈ E(∅) implies X ∈ E(N);
(4) has the liveness property if ∅ /∈ E(C), for every C ∈ PN ;
(5) has the safety property if S ∈ E(C), for every C ∈ PN .
We call E playable whenever (1)–(5) are satisfied. We say that E is truly playable
if it is playable and E(∅) is a principal filter in PS.3
The following result, which was originally proved in [10, Theorem 1], amends
the gap in the proof of Pauly’s correspondence result in case of an infinite outcome
space S. We provide an alternative proof of Theorem 2.7 in Appendix A, which
shows that this result can be considered as a corollary of Peleg’s Theorem [21,
Theorem 3.5*].
Theorem 2.7 ([10, Theorem 1]). Let E : PN → PPS be an effectivity function.
There exists a game form G = (N, {Σi | i ∈ N}, S, o) satisfying E = HG if and
only if E is truly playable.
3. Many-valued effectivity functions
We are going to generalize the concept of effectivity function for an arbitrary
game form G = (N, {Σi | i ∈ N}, S, o) and Łukasiewicz chain Łn as in (1.1). Our
goal is to capture the degree or extent to which a coalition C can “enforce” a function
f : S → Łn. Before stating a formal definition, we will motivate this idea by two
situations where such many-valued assessments f may arise.
(1) A strategic game form G is made into a strategic game when a utility
function (or a preference relation) over the outcome set S is introduced for
every player i ∈ N . Thus an arbitrary function f ∈ ŁSn can be viewed as
a utility function. However, this utility function is not necessarily attached
to any player’s preference relation.
(2) When the state space S is too large or complex to deal with, the distinc-
tion between the subsets of S (equivalently, the functions S → {0, 1}) and
the functions f ∈ ŁSn may become immaterial. It is not against the spirit
of neighborhood semantics to draw a direct parallel with an analogous sit-
uation in topology: by Urysohn’s lemma any two closed disjoint subsets
in a normal topological space can be arbitrarily closely approximated by
a [0, 1]-valued continuous function. Thus, for a sufficiently large natural
number n, we may think of functions f ∈ ŁSn as members of some limit
sequence, which eventually encodes a subset of S. This interpretation of
an originally finite object is not uncommon in game theory. Indeed, it was
one of the motivations for the development of Aumann’s theory of ideal
coalitions in coalition games with continuum of players; see [5].
3Our formulation of true playability is different from the original definition yet equivalent to
it by [10, Proposition 5].
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Definition 3.1. Let G = (N, {Σi | i ∈ N}, S, o) be a game form. The Łn-valued
effectivity function of G is the map EG : PN × Ł
S
n → Łn defined by
(3.1) EG(C, f) = max
σC
min
σC
f(o(σCσC)), C ∈ PN, f ∈ Ł
S
n ,
where σC and σC range through the set of all joint strategies of coalitions C and C,
respectively.
The meaning of definition (3.1) is the following: coalition C is effective for f ∈ ŁSn
to the degree EG(C, f) ∈ Łn, disregarding the strategic options of players in the
opposite coalition C. Note that the usual Boolean α-effectivity function associated
with G coincides with the Ł1-valued effectivity function of G.
Remark 3.2. In this paper we do not advocate any particular interpretation of the
many-valued effectivity model (3.1) as suggested by (1)–(2) above, nor do we insist
on a special meaning of truth degrees. From the purely mathematical point of view,
any such interpretation is irrelevant since it yields the same underlying game form
under the assumption of several playability conditions introduced in Section 4. This
point will be explained in detail in Remark 4.10.
4. Playability of Łn-valued effectivity functions
Analogously to the classical literature [16, 21] on effectivity functions, we can
study the notion of effectivity in a setting independent of game forms. Let S be
a set of outcomes and N be a finite player set. We always assume that |S| ≥ 2 and
|N | ≥ 2.
Definition 4.1. An Łn-valued effectivity function is a mapping E : PN×Ł
S
n → Łn.
Note that the Ł1-valued effectivity functions are exactly the effectivity functions
PN × {0, 1}S → {0, 1} arising in the Boolean framework [1, 20]. Therefore we call
any Ł1-valued effectivity function a Boolean effectivity function.
Our goal is to characterize the class of Łn-valued effectivity functions that are
associated with game forms. This characterization is related to the properties
of effectivity functions listed in Definition 4.2. We use the standard connectives
of Łukasiewicz logic and respective operations of MV-algebras; see Appendix B.
In particular, we always apply the operations of the MV-algebra Łn to functions f
in ŁSn pointwise. For any Łn-valued effectivity function E, we define E(∅,−)
−1(1) =
{f ∈ ŁSn | E(∅, f) = 1}.
Definition 4.2. Let E be an Łn-valued effectivity function. We say that E
(1) is outcome monotonic whenever f ≥ g implies E(C, f) ≥ E(C, g), for every
C ∈ PN and every f, g ∈ ŁSn ;
(2) is N -maximal if ¬E(∅,¬f) ≤ E(N, f) for every f ∈ ŁSn ;
(3) is regular if it satisfies E(C, f) ≤ ¬E(C,¬f) for every C ∈ PN and f ∈ ŁSn ;
(4) is superadditive if E(C1, f) ∧ E(C2, g) ≤ E(C1 ∪ C2, f ∧ g) for every pair
of coalitions C1, C2 ∈ PN such that C1 ∩ C2 = ∅ and every f, g ∈ Ł
S
n ;
(5) is coalition monotonic if E(C, f) ≤ E(C′, f) for every C ⊆ C′ ∈ PN and
every f ∈ ŁSn ;
(6) is homogeneous if E(C, f ⊕ f) = E(C, f) ⊕ E(C, f) and E(C, f ⊙ f) =
E(C, f)⊙ E(C, f) for every C ∈ PN and every f ∈ ŁSn ;
(7) has the liveness property if E(C, 1) = 1 for every C ∈ PN ;
(8) has the safety property if E(C, 0) = 0 for every C ∈ PN ;
(9) is principal if there exists some g ∈ ŁSn such that {f ∈ Ł
S
n | E(∅, f) = 1} =
{f ∈ ŁSn | f ≥
⊙n
i=1 g}.
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We say that E is playable whenever it is outcome monotonic, N -maximal, superad-
ditive, homogeneous, and has liveness and safety properties. We say that E is truly
playable if it is playable and principal.
If n = 1, then the definitions of (truly) playable Boolean effectivity function
coincide with the corresponding definitions used in the Boolean setting [20, 10];
cf. Definition 2.6.
Note that if E is an outcome monotonic and homogeneous Łn-valued effectiv-
ity function, then E(C,−)−1(1) is an MV-filter of the MV-algebra ŁSn [9]. Moreover,
the Łn-valued effectivity function E is principal whenever the MV-filter E(∅,−)
−1(1)
is principal; see Appendix B.
It may be difficult to get some intuition about the definition of a homogeneous
Łn-valued effectivity function in the game form framework. We refer to Remark 5.19
for an equivalent formulation of this definition. The following result illustrates that
homogeneity arises naturally in the context of game forms. For every set Y ⊆ S,
we denote by χY the characteristic function of Y .
Proposition 4.3. If G = (N, {Σi | i ∈ N}, S, o) is a game form, then EG is a truly
playable Łn-valued effectivity function.
Proof. It follows directly from Definition 3.1 that EG is outcome monotonic, N -
maximal and has liveness and safety. Homogeneity of EG follows from the fact that
the maps τ⊕ : x 7→ x ⊕ x and τ⊙ : x 7→ x ⊙ x are lattice homomorphisms of Łn.
Moreover, EG(∅,−)
−1(1) = {g | g ≥ χran(o)}, which shows that EG is principal
since
⊙n
i=1 χran(o) = χran(o).
It remains to prove that EG is superadditive. Let C1, C2 ∈ PN be such that
C1 ∩ C2 = ∅ and f1, f2 ∈ Ł
S
n . Denote by σ
∗
C1
and σ∗C2 two strategy tuples satisfy-
ing E(C1, f1) = minσ
C1
f1(o(σ
∗
C1
σC1)) and E(C2, f2) = minσC2
f2(o(σ
∗
C2
σC2)). It
follows that E(C1, f1)∧E(C2, f2) = minσC1
minσC2
f1(o(σ
∗
C1
σC1))∧f2(o(σ
∗
C2
σC2)),
which is not greater than minσ
C1∩C2
(f1 ∧ f2)(o(σ
∗
C1
σ∗C2σC1∩C2)). The conclusion
follows from the fact that the latter is bounded above by EG(C1 ∪C2, f1 ∧ f2). 
As the next result shows, a Boolean effectivity function can be associated with
any homogeneous Łn-valued effectivity function. The Boolean algebra Ł
S
1 = {0, 1}
S
is called the Boolean skeleton of ŁSn . In other words, the Boolean skeleton of Ł
S
n is
the powerset of S if we identify the subsets of S with their characteristic functions
on S. An element f ∈ ŁSn belongs to the Boolean skeleton of Ł
S
n if and only if
f ⊕ f = f , and such an element is said to be idempotent. For every Łn-valued
effectivity function E : PN × ŁSn → Łn, we denote by E
♯ the restriction of E to
PN × ŁS1 .
Lemma 4.4. If E is a homogeneous Łn-valued effectivity function, then E
♯ is
a Boolean effectivity function. If in addition E is playable (respectively, truly
playable), then so is E♯.
Proof. For any idempotent element f ∈ ŁSn and for every C ∈ PN , we obtain
E(C, f)⊕ E(C, f) = E(C, f ⊕ f) = E(C, f).
Therefore E♯ is a Boolean effectivity function.
If in addition E is playable (respectively, truly playable), then it satisfies condi-
tions (1), (2), (4), (7) and (8) (respectively, conditions (1), (2), (4), (7), (8) and
(9)) of Definition 4.2. It follows that E♯ also satisfies the analogous Boolean condi-
tions (see Appendix A) since they do not involve any existential quantifier over the
elements of ŁSn . 
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In order to study the playability property, we need more technical preliminaries.
To this end, put
τ⊕(x) = x⊕ x and τ⊙(x) = x⊙ x, for every x ∈ Łn.
Definition 4.5. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We define the function τi/n : Łn → Łn by
τi/n(x) =
{
0 x < in ,
1 x ≥ in ,
and we always assume that τi/n is the interpretation on Łn of an algebraic term
which is a composition of finitely many copies of the maps τ⊕ and τ⊙ alone.
4
Any mapping τ : Łn → Łn can be composed with a function f ∈ Ł
S
n . Thus we
define τ(f)(s) = τ(f(s)) for every s ∈ S and f ∈ ŁSn .
Lemma 4.6. Let E,E′ : PN × ŁSn → Łn be homogeneous Łn-valued effectivity
functions. Then E = E′ if and only if E♯ = E′♯.
Proof. Necessity is trivial. To prove sufficiency assume that E♯ = E′♯. Let C ∈
PN , f ∈ ŁSn and i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Since τi/n(f) is idempotent and E and E
′ are
homogeneous, we have E(C, f) ≥ in if and only if 1 = E(C, τi/n(f)) = E
′(C, τi/n(f)),
which is equivalent to E′(C, f) ≥ in . 
The following lemma is straightforward. Its statement uses the notion of the
Boolean effectivity function HG associated with a game form G; see Definition 2.4.
Lemma 4.7. Let G be a game form. If HG and EG are the Boolean and the
Łn-valued effectivity function associated with G, respectively, then HG = E
♯
G.
For any r ∈ [0, 1], we denote by ⌈r⌉ the element min{a ∈ Łn | a ≥ r}. The
following lemma will turn out to be crucial for understanding the limits of expres-
sive power of the language associated with (truly) playable Łn-valued effectivity
functions; see Proposition 5.8.
Lemma 4.8. If H : PN ×ŁS1 → Ł1 is a playable Boolean effectivity function, then
the function E : PN × ŁSn → Łn defined by
(4.1) E(C, f) = max
{
i
n ∈ Łn | H(C, τi/n(f)) = 1
}
,
for every C ∈ PN and f ∈ ŁSn, is a playable Łn-valued effectivity function that
satisfies E♯ = H. If in addition H is truly playable, then so is E.
Proof. Clearly E♯ = H . It follows from outcome monotonicity of H that E is
outcome monotonic. Since H has liveness and safety, so does the function E. To
prove that E is superadditive, assume on the contrary that there exist f, g ∈ ŁSn
and C,D ∈ PN such that C ∩D = ∅ and E(C ∪D, f ∧g) < in ≤ E(C, f)∧E(D, g)
for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. On the one hand, it follows that H(C ∪ D, τi/n(f) ∧
τi/n(g)) = H(C ∪D, τi/n(f ∧g)) = 0. On the other hand, we obtain H(C, τi/n(f)) =
H(D, τi/n(g)) = 1 and by superadditivity of H we get H(C∪D, τi/n(f)∧τi/n(g)) = 1,
a contradiction.
Now, let f ∈ ŁSn . Since τi/n(f ⊕ f) = τ⌈i/2n⌉(f) ∈ Ł
S
1 , it follows from the
definition of E that E(C, f ⊕ f) ≥ in if and only if H(C, τ⌈i/2n⌉(f)) = 1. Using
again the definition of E, the latter is equivalent to E(C, f) ≥ ⌈ i2n⌉, which is the
same as E(C, f) ⊕ E(C, f) ≥ in . We can proceed in a similar way to prove that
E(C, f ⊙ f) = E(C, f) ⊙ E(C, f) for every f ∈ ŁSn.
To prove N -maximality of E, consider f ∈ ŁSn and i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}. It follows
from the definition of E and N -maximality of H that E(N, f) ≤ in if and only
4The proof of existence of such a term appears in [19].
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if H(∅,¬τ(i + 1)/n(f)) = 1. Since ¬τ(i + 1)/n(f) = τ(n− i)/n(¬f), the last identity is
equivalent to H(∅, τ(n− i)/n(¬f)) = 1 and finally to ¬E(∅,¬f) ≤
i
n .
Assume that H is truly playable. Definition 2.6 yields existence of g ∈ ŁS1 such
that H(∅,−)−1(1) = {h ∈ ŁS1 | h ≥ g}. Since E is homogeneous, E(∅,−)
−1(1) =
{f ∈ ŁSn | H(∅, τ1(f)) = 1} = {f ∈ Ł
S
n | τ1(f) ≥ g}. The latter is equal to
{f ∈ ŁSn | f ≥ g} since E(∅,−)
−1(1) is an MV-filter of ŁSn and g is idempotent. 
The following result, which is the Łn-valued generalization of [20, Theorem 3.2]
and [10, Theorem 1], completes the characterization of truly playable Łn-valued
effectivity functions.
Theorem 4.9. An Łn-valued effectivity function E : PN × Ł
S
n → Łn is truly
playable if and only if there is a game form G such that E = EG.
Proof. By Proposition 4.3, EG is truly playable. Conversely, assume that E is
truly playable. By Lemma 4.4 and Theorem 2.7, there exists a game form G such
that HG = E
♯, where HG is the Boolean effectivity function of G. We obtain by
Lemma 4.7 that E♯ = HG = E
♯
G, where EG is the Łn-valued effectivity function
associated with G. The conclusion E = EG follows from Lemma 4.6. 
Remark 4.10. The previous theorem implies that the notions of playability for
Boolean effectivity functions and Łn-valued functions are equivalent on the game-
theoretic level since any of those concepts leads to a uniquely determined game
form. In our more general setting we were able to maintain the correspondence
with game forms by imposing homogeneity and the Łn-version of the playability
axioms in the case of the Łn-valued effectivity functions. Admittedly, we do not
arrive at a new concept of game form or extend the validity of Boolean effectivity
functions to a larger class of objects. Nevertheless, the importance of our approach
presented herein lies in an alternative representation of the classical setting: al-
lowing for a richer language and more truth degrees leaves the underlying class
of game forms invariant. This situation is similar to the development of many-
valued probability theory starting from Łukasiewicz logic: while every probability
of an MV-algebra induces a unique “classical” probability [14], the more general
concept of MV-probability forms a solid basis for studying a number of stochastic
phenomena, betting games among them; cf. [17, Chapter 1].
It is useful to introduce a weaker notion of playability. To this end, we need this
preparatory result.
Lemma 4.11. If E is a playable Łn-valued effectivity function, then E is coalition
monotonic and regular.
Proof. We proceed by contradiction to prove that E is regular. Assume that there
are C ∈ PN , f ∈ ŁSn and i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that ¬E(C,¬f) <
i
n ≤ E(C, f).
Put j = 1 − i−1n . Since E is homogeneous, it follows that E(C, τi/n(f)) = 1 and
E(C, τj/n(¬f)) = 1. Thus we obtain by superadditivity E(N, τi/n(f)∧τj/n(¬f)) = 1,
which contradicts safety since τi/n(f) ∧ τj/n(¬f) = 0.
We prove that E is coalition monotonic. Let C ⊆ C′ ∈ PN and f ∈ ŁSn . By
applying superadditivity to C1 = C and C2 = C
′ \C we obtain E(C, f) ≤ E(C′, f),
which is the desired result. 
Definition 4.12. An Łn-valued effectivity function E : PN × Ł
S
n → Łn is semi-
playable if E(C, f) ≤ E(C, g) for every f ≤ g ∈ ŁSn and every coalition C 6= N , if E
has liveness and safety for coalitions C 6= N , and if it satisfies superadditivity for
coalitions C1 and C2 such that C1 ∩ C2 = ∅ and C1 ∪ C2 6= N .
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Proposition 4.13. An Łn-valued effectivity function E : PN×Ł
S
n → Łn is playable
if and only if it is semi-playable, homogeneous, regular and N -maximal.
Proof. The first implication follows from Lemma 4.11. Conversely, assume that E
is semi-playable, homogeneous, regular and N -maximal. First we prove superad-
ditivity. Let C ∈ PN with C 6= N . We have to verify that E(C, f) ∧ E(C, g) ≤
E(N, f ∧ g). By way of contradiction, assume that there is i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such
that E(N, f ∧ g) < in ≤ E(C, f) ∧ E(C, g). Since E is homogeneous, we obtain
E(C, τi/n(f)) = 1 = E(C, τi/n(g)), while, by N -maximality, E(∅,¬τi/n(f ∧g)) = 1.
It follows from superadditivity that E(C, τi/n(f)∧¬τi/n(f∧g)) = 1, which is equiva-
lent to E(C, τi/n(f)∧¬(τi/n(f)∧ τi/n(g))) = 1, since τi/n(f ∧g) = τi/n(f)∧ τi/n(g).
From the fact that τi/n(f) and τi/n(g) belong to the Boolean skeleton of Ł
S
n we
deduce E(C, τi/n(f) ∧ ¬τi/n(g)) = 1. We conclude that E(C,¬τi/n(g)) = 1 by out-
come monotonicity and finally that E(C, τi/n(g)) = 0 by regularity, which is the
desired contradiction.
It is easy to check that the liveness and safety conditions are satisfied for C = N .
Moreover, E is N -maximal and homogeneous by assumption. It remains to prove
that E is outcome monotonic. If f ≤ g ∈ ŁSn , we obtain successively
E(N, f) ≤ ¬E(∅,¬f) ≤ ¬E(∅,¬g) ≤ E(N, g)
where the first inequality is obtained by regularity, the second by monotonicity and
the third by N -maximality. 
5. Łn-valued modal language and semantics for effectivity functions
In this section we build a many-valued modal logic in the spirit of [20, 10] that
captures the properties of (truly) playable Łn-valued effectivity functions.
5.1. Neighborhood semantics for playable Łn-valued effectivity functions.
Let L be the language {→,¬, 1} ∪ {[C] | C ∈ PN} where →, ¬, 1 are binary,
unary and constant, respectively, and [C] is a unary modality for every C ∈ PN .
The set L of formulas is defined inductively from the countably infinite set Prop of
propositional variables by the following rules:
φ ::= 1 | p | φ→ φ | ¬φ | [C]φ
where p ∈ Prop and C ∈ PN . We use 0 as an abbreviation of ¬1. The intended
reading of the formula [C]φ is ‘coalition C can enforce φ ’. In the language L we
also use the standard abbreviations for defined connectives in Łukasiewicz logic; see
Appendix B.
We introduce a semantics for L which is based on a class of action models called
Łn-frames. Such frames are Łn-valued extensions of coalition frames introduced in
[20]. The coalition frames are a very general model of interaction in which an effec-
tivity function is associated with each outcome state in S. Under the assumption
of true playability, this is equivalent to specifying a game form for every outcome
state in S.
Definition 5.1. An Łn-frame is a tuple F = (S,E), where S is a non-empty
set of outcome states and E is a mapping sending each outcome state u ∈ S to
an Łn-valued effectivity function E(u) : PN × Ł
S
n → Łn. A tuple M = (F,Val) is
an Łn-model (based on F) if F = (S,E) is an Łn-frame and Val: S × Prop→ Łn.
We use the Łukasiewicz interpretations of the connectives ¬,→, 1 in Łn; see
Appendix B. For every Łn-modelM, the valuation map Val is extended inductively
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to S×L by setting
Val(u, φ→ ψ) = Val(u, φ)→ Val(u, ψ),(5.1)
Val(u,¬ψ) = ¬Val(u, ψ),(5.2)
Val(u, 1) = 1,(5.3)
Val(u, [C]φ) = E(u)
(
C,Val(−, φ)
)
,(5.4)
for every C ∈ PN and every φ, ψ ∈L. We use the standard notation and termi-
nology. We say that a formula φ is true in M = (F,Val) and write M |= φ if
Val(u, φ) = 1 for every u ∈ S. A formula φ is valid in an Łn-frame F if it is true in
every Łn-valued model based on F.
In order to proceed further, we need to generalize the technique of filtration [8,
Chapter 7.5] for neighborhood models.
Definition 5.2. Let M = (S,E,Val) be an Łn-valued model and Γ be a set of
formulas closed under subformulas and the unary connectives τ⊕ : φ 7→ φ ⊕ φ and
τ⊙ : φ 7→ φ⊙ φ. Consider the equivalence relation ≡Γ defined on S by
u ≡Γ v if ∀φ ∈ Γ Val(u, φ) = Val(v, φ).
We denote by |S| the set of equivalence classes |u| for ≡Γ. An Łn-model M
∗ =
(|S|, E∗,Val∗) is a Γ-filtration ofM if the following conditions are satisfied for every
u ∈ S:
(1) Val∗(|u|, p) = Val(u, p) for every p ∈ Prop ∩ Γ,
(2) E(u)(C,Val(−, φ)) = E∗(|u|)(C, |Val(−, φ)|) for every C ∈ PN and φ ∈ Γ,
where the map |Val(−, φ)| : |S| → Łn is defined by |Val(|u|, φ)| = Val(u, φ).
Lemma 5.3. LetM = (S,E,Val) be an Łn-valued model and Γ be a set of formulas
closed under subformulas and the connectives τ⊕ and τ⊙. If M
∗ = (|S|, E∗,Val∗)
is a Γ-filtration of M, then
(5.5) Val(u, φ) = Val∗(|u|, φ)
for every φ ∈ Γ and every u ∈ S.
Proof. Note that identity (5.5) is equivalent to Val∗(−, φ) = |Val(−, φ)|. The proof
is a standard induction argument on the length of φ ∈ Γ. We consider only the
case where φ = [C]ψ ∈ Γ for C ∈ PN . By the definition of Val∗ and the induction
hypothesis, we obtain
Val∗(|u|, [C]ψ) = E∗(|u|)(C,Val∗(−, ψ)) = E∗(|u|)(C, |Val(−, ψ)|).
It follows from Definition 5.2(2) that
E∗(|u|)(C, |Val(−, ψ)|) = E(u)(C,Val(−, ψ)) = Val(u, [C]ψ). 
In what follows we focus on the relations between the language L and the Łn-
frames in which the effectivity functions are (truly) playable.
Definition 5.4. An Łn-frame F = (S,E) is said to be (truly) playable if E(u) is
(truly) playable for every u ∈ S. An Łn-model M is (truly) playable if it is based
on a (truly) playable Łn-frame.
Our first aim is to prove that, similarly as in the Boolean case [10], there is
no set of L-formulas that can define truly playable Łn-frames inside the class of
playable Łn-frames. To this end, we show that for any playable Łn-model M and
any formula φ, there is a finite playable Łn-model Mφ such that M |= φ if and
only if Mφ |= φ. We use this property and the fact that finite playable Łn-models
are truly playable to prove Proposition 5.8. The construction of Mφ is based on
a refinement of filtration for playable Łn-valued models. We proceed in two steps.
The next definition constitutes the first step in this direction.
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Definition 5.5. Using the notation of Definition 5.2, an Łn-valued model M
∗ =
(|S|, E∗,Val∗) is an intermediate Γ-filtration of a playable Łn-modelM = (S,E,Val)
if M∗ is a Γ-filtration of M that satisfies
E∗(|u|)(C, f) = max{E(u)(C,Val(−, φ)) | φ ∈ Γ and |Val(−, φ)| ≤ f},(5.6)
E∗(|u|)(N, f) = ¬E∗(|u|)(∅,¬f),(5.7)
for every proper coalition C ∈ PN and every f ∈ Ł
|S|
n .
Observe that since we have assumed playability (N -maximality, in particular) of
M in Definition 5.5, an intermediate Γ-filtration of M is indeed a Γ-filtration in
the sense of Definition 5.2.
For every formula µ we denote by Cl(µ) the closure of the set of subformulas of
µ for the connectives ¬ and →. The next lemma shows that an intermediate Cl(µ)-
filtration is an intermediate step in the construction of a playable Cl(µ)-filtration
of a playable Łn-model. Recall that by E(u)
♯ we denote the function that is the
restriction of the Łn-valued effectivity function E(u) : PN×Ł
S
n → Łn to the domain
PN × ŁS1 .
Lemma 5.6. Let µ ∈L and M = (S,E,Val) be a playable Łn-model. If M
∗ =
(|S|, E∗,Val∗) is an intermediate Cl(µ)-filtration of M, then the Boolean effectivity
function E∗(|u|)♯ : PN × ŁS1 → Ł1 is playable for every u ∈ S.
Proof. By n.φ we denote the formula
⊕n
i=1 φ. First, observe that if u ∈ S, f ∈ Ł
|S|
1
and C 6= N is a coalition, then
E∗(|u|)(C, f) = max{E(u)♯(C,Val(−, n.φ)) | φ ∈ Γ and |Val(−, n.φ)| ≤ f},
which shows that E∗(|u|)♯ is a Boolean effectivity function. We prove that E∗(|u|)♯
is regular and semi-playable (see Definition 4.12). It is straightforward to show that
E∗(|u|)♯(C,−) is monotonic and has liveness and safety for every coalition C 6= N .
Moreover, N -maximality holds for E∗(|u|)♯ according to (5.7).
Let us prove superadditivity for coalitions C,D such that C∩D = ∅ and C∪D 6=
N . If f, g ∈ Ł
|S|
1 , then E
∗(|u|)(C, f) ∧ E∗(|u|)(D, g) is by definition equal to the
maximum of the values E(u)(C,Val(−, ψ))∧E(u)(D,Val(−, ρ)), where ψ and ρ run
through the elements of Cl(µ) satisfying |Val(−, ψ)| ≤ f and |Val(−, ρ)| ≤ g. By
superadditivity of E we have
E(u)(C,Val(−, ψ)) ∧ E(u)(D,Val(−, ρ)) ≤ E(u)(C ∪D,Val(−, ψ ∧ ρ)),
for every formula ψ and ρ. Thus it follows from the definition of E∗ that
E∗(|u|)(C, f) ∧E∗(|u|)(D, g) ≤ E∗(|u|)(C ∪D, f ∧ g),
which is the desired result.
It remains to prove that for every C ∈ PN and every f ∈ Ł
|S|
1 such that
E∗(|u|)(C, f) = 1, we have E∗(|u|)(C,¬f) = 0. By condition (5.7), we may as-
sume that C 6= N . Suppose for the sake of contradiction that E∗(|u|)(C,¬f) = 1.
By (5.6) this means that there are some ψ, ρ ∈ Cl(µ) such that |Val(−, ψ)| ≤ f
and |Val(−, ρ)| ≤ ¬f , and E(u)(C,Val(−, ψ)) = E(u)(C,Val(−, ρ)) = 1. By super-
additivity of E, we obtain E(N,Val(−, ψ ∧ ρ)) = 1 with ψ ∧ ρ ∈ Cl(µ) satisfying
|Val(−, ψ ∧ ρ)| ≤ f ∧ ¬f . By (5.6), (5.7), Definition 5.2 (2), N -maximality of E
and the fact that f ∈ Ł
|S|
1 , we obtain E
∗(|u|)(N, 0) = 1. This is a contradiction
since E∗(|u|)(N, 0) = ¬E∗(|u|)(∅, 1) = 0 by (5.7) and liveness of E∗ for the empty
coalition. 
We combine Lemma 5.6 together with Lemma 4.8 to construct Cl(µ)-filtrations
that preserve playability.
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Proposition 5.7. If µ ∈L and M = (S,E,Val) is a playable Łn-model, then there
is a playable Cl(µ)-filtration M+ = (|S|, E+,Val+) of M.
Proof. Consider the intermediate Cl(µ)-filtration M∗ = (|S|, E∗,Val∗) of M. By
Lemma 5.6, the Boolean effectivity function E∗(|u|)♯ : PN × Ł
|S|
1 → Ł1 is playable
for every u ∈ S. By Lemma 4.8, the map E+(|u|) : PN × Ł
|S|
n → Łn defined by
E+(|u|)(C, f) = max
{
i
n ∈ Łn | E
∗(|u|)♯(C, τi/n(f)) = 1
}
is also playable. We prove that M∗ := (|S|, E+,Val∗) is a Cl(µ)-filtration of M.
It suffices to check that M+ satisfies condition (2) of Definition 5.2. Let u ∈ S,
C ∈ PN , φ ∈ Cl(µ) and i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We obtain by definition of E+ that
E+(|u|)(C, |Val(−, φ)|) ≥ i/n if and only if E∗(|u|)♯(C, |Val(−, τi/n(φ))|) = 1. Since
M∗ is an intermediate Cl(µ)-filtration of M, the last identity is in turn equivalent
to E(u)(C,Val(−, τi/n(φ)) = 1. Finally, this gives E(u)(C,Val(−, φ)) ≥ i/n. 
The next result shows that the gain of expressive power induced by the many-
valued nature of L and of its associated semantics is not enough to single out those
playable models that are truly playable.
Proposition 5.8. There is no set Λ of L-formulas such that a playable Łn-frame
F is truly playable if and only if every formula of Λ is valid in F.
Proof. Assume that there exists a set Λ of L-formulas such that a playable Łn-
frame F is truly playable if and only if every formula of Λ is valid in F. Let F
be a playable Łn-frame which is not truly playable. The existence of such F is
a consequence of Lemma 4.8 applied to the effectivity function E defined in [10,
Proposition 4]. For every φ ∈ Λ and every model M based on F, Proposition 5.7
provides a playable Cl(φ)-filtration M+. Since M+ has a finite set of outcome
states, it is truly playable. It follows from the definition of Λ that M+ |= φ and
from Lemma 5.3 that M |= φ. We have proved that every formula of Λ is true
in every model based on F and we conclude that F is truly playable, which is the
desired contradiction. 
5.2. Łn-valued playable logic for finite playable Łn-frames. Proposition 5.8
says that L is not adequate for capturing the properties of Łn-valued effectivity
functions associated with game forms. Indeed, this language is not even expres-
sive enough to distinguish between the playable and the truly playable Łn-frames.
Nevertheless, when the set of outcome states S is finite, every playable Łn-valued
effectivity function is truly playable and it turns out that playability can be en-
coded by L-formulas; see our completeness result, Theorem 5.18. We start with
axiomatizing the properties of playable Łn-valued effectivity functions.
Definition 5.9. An Łn-valued playable logic is a subset L of L which is closed
under Modus Ponens, Uniform Substitution and Monotonicity (if φ → ψ ∈ L,
then [C]φ → [C]ψ ∈ L for every C ∈ PN) and that contains an axiomatic base
of Łukasiewicz (n + 1)-valued logic (see [11] or [9, Section 8.5]) together with the
following axioms:
The axioms of Łn-valued playable logic
(1) [C](p⊙ p)↔ [C]p⊙ [C]p,
(2) [C](p⊕ p)↔ [C]p⊕ [C]p,
(3) ¬[C]0,
(4) ([C]p ∧ [C′]q)→ [C ∪ C′](p ∧ q),
(5) [∅]p→ ¬[N ]¬p,
for every C,C′ ∈ PN such that C ∩C′ = ∅.
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We denote by Pn the smallest Łn-valued playable logic, that is, the intersection of
all the Łn-valued playable logics. We conform with common usage and we often
write ⊢Pn φ instead of φ ∈ Pn.
Remark 5.10. The use of the notation ⊢Pn is justified by the observation that Pn
can be equivalently introduced through a Hilbert style proof system. Indeed, it
suffices to consider the Hilbert system whose axioms are the axioms (1)–(5) above
together with an axiomatic base of Łukasiewicz (n + 1)-valued logic, and whose
inference rules are Modus Ponens, Uniform Substitution and Monotonicity. Clearly,
a formula φ is a theorem in this system if and only if it belongs to Pn.
The axioms (1)–(5) together with the Monotonicity rule reflect the properties
defining playability. In Remark 5.19 at the end of this section, we give equivalent
and more intuitive axioms that can replace (1)–(2) in the axiomatization of Pn.
The following lemma can be proved by a standard induction argument.
Lemma 5.11. Let M be a playable Łn-model. If ⊢Pn φ, then M |= φ.
We will prove completeness of Pn with respect to the class of playable Łn-models.
Our proof is based on the construction of the canonical model.
5.2.1. Construction of the canonical model. Let us denote by FPn the Lindenbaum-
Tarski algebra of Pn, that is, the quotient of L under the syntactic equivalence
relation ≡ defined by
φ ≡ ψ if ⊢Pn φ→ ψ and ⊢Pn ψ → φ,
equipped with the operations 1, ¬, → and [C] defined as 1 := 1/ ≡, ¬(φ/ ≡) :=
¬φ/ ≡, φ/ ≡→ ψ/ ≡ := (φ→ ψ)/ ≡ and [C](φ/ ≡) := [C]φ/ ≡, for every C ∈ PN
and every φ, ψ ∈L. By abuse of notation, we denote the class φ/ ≡ by φ.
Since the logic Pn contains every tautology of Łukasiewicz (n+ 1)-valued logic,
the {→,¬, 1}-reduct of FPn is an MV-algebra that belongs to the variety MVn
generated by Łn.
In the Boolean setting, one of the key ingredients of the construction of the
canonical model is the ultrafilter theorem that allows us to separate by an ultrafilter
any two different non-top elements of a Boolean algebra B. We can rephrase this
separation result using the bijective correspondence between the ultrafilters of B
and the homomorphisms of B into the two-element Boolean algebra 2: for every
a 6= b ∈ B \ {1}, there is a homomorphism u : B → 2 such that u(a) = 1 and
u(b) = 0. The variety MVn has an analogous property [9].
Lemma 5.12. Let A ∈ MVn. For every a 6= b in A \ {1}, there is a {¬,→, 1}-
homomorphism u : A→ Łn such that u(a) = 1 and u(b) 6= 1.
This separation property explains our choice of the setW c of {¬,→, 1}-homomorphisms
from FPn to Łn as the universe of the canonical model of Pn.
We will use the following technique to associate an Łn-valued effectivity function
Ec(u) with every u ∈ W c. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we will define a subset Pi of
PN ×W c × ŁW
c
n , such that P1 ⊇ · · · ⊇ Pn. Then we will safely set
Ec(u)(C, f) := max
{
i
n ∈ Łn | (C, u, f) ∈ Pi
}
.
Definition 5.13. For every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} let Pi be the subset of PN ×W
c×ŁW
c
n
defined by
(5.8)
Pi =
{
(C, u, f) | ∃φ
(
u([C]φ) ≥ in and ∀v ∈W
c
(
v(φ) ≥ in =⇒ f(v) ≥
i
n
))}
.
We use the convention P0 = PN ×W
c × ŁW
c
n .
Lemma 5.14. The inclusion Pi ⊆ Pi−1 holds for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
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Proof. Assume that φ satisfies the condition defining Pi in (5.8) for C, f , u and
i > 0 and put ρ = τi/n(φ). Then u([C]ρ) = τi/n
(
u([C]φ)
)
= 1 ≥ i−1n . Moreover,
if v(ρ) ≥ i−1n , then v(ρ) = 1 since ρ belongs to the Boolean skeleton of FPn .
Therefore v(φ) ≥ in , which gives f(v) ≥
i
n ≥
i−1
n . 
Definition 5.15. The canonical model of Pn is the Łn-model M = (F,Val
c) with
F = (W c, Ec) where Ec(u)(C, f) is defined for every u ∈ W c, every C ∈ PN and
every f ∈ ŁW
c
n by
(5.9) Ec(u)
(
C, f) =
{
max
{
i
n ∈ Łn | (C, u, f) ∈ Pi
}
if C 6= N,
¬Ec(u)(∅,¬f) if C = N,
and where Valc is defined by
(5.10) Valc(u, p) = u(p),
for every p ∈ Prop and u ∈W c.
In particular, for every (C, u, f) ∈ PN ×W c × ŁW
c
n with C 6= N , we have
(5.11) Ec(u)
(
C, f) ≥
i
n
if and only if (C, u, f) ∈ Pi.
The next proposition shows that the identity (5.10) remains true in the canonical
model after replacing p by any formula µ ∈L.
Proposition 5.16 (Truth Lemma). The canonical model (W c, Ec,Valc) of Pn
satisfies Valc(u, µ) = u(µ) for every µ ∈L and every u ∈W
c.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the number of connectives in µ. If µ ∈ Prop or
µ ∈ {1,¬ψ, ψ → ρ}, then the result follows immediately from (5.1) – (5.3).
Let µ = [C]ψ for some ψ ∈L and C ∈ PN \ {N}. We will prove that for any
u ∈W c and i ≤ n,
(5.12) Ec(u)
(
C,Valc(−, ψ)
)
≥
i
n
if and only if u([C]ψ) ≥
i
n
.
First, assume Ec(u)
(
C,Valc(−, ψ)
)
≥ in . Then, by (5.11) and (5.8), there is ρ ∈L
such that u([C]ρ) ≥ in and Val
c(v, ψ) ≥ in for any v ∈ W
c satisfying v(ρ) ≥ in .
By the induction hypothesis, this means that for every v ∈ W c with v(ρ) ≥ in , we
have v(ψ) ≥ in . It follows that v
(
τi/n(ρ) → τi/n(ψ)
)
= 1 for every v ∈ W c. This
yields ⊢Pn τi/n(ρ) → τi/n(ψ) since the {→,¬, 1}-reduct of FPn has the separation
property (Lemma 5.12). As Pn is closed under Monotonicity, we obtain
⊢Pn [C]τi/n(ρ)→ [C]τi/n(ψ).
By axioms (1) and (2) of Pn (Definition 5.9) and Uniform Substitution, this is
equivalent to
⊢Pn τi/n([C]ρ)→ τi/n([C]ψ).
Hence, if v ∈ W c and v([C]ρ) ≥ in , then v([C]ψ) ≥
i
n . We can thus conclude that
u([C]ψ) ≥ in .
Conversely, let u([C]ψ) ≥ in . We obtain (C, u,Val(−, ψ)) ∈ Pi by the induction
hypothesis and by considering φ = ψ in the definition (5.8) of Pi. This proves
(5.12).
Finally, assume µ = [N ]ψ for some ψ ∈L. We will prove
Ec(u)(N,Val(−, ψ)) = u([N ]ψ).
Indeed, on the one hand we obtain
Ec(u)(N,Val(−, ψ)) = ¬Ec(u)(∅,Val(−,¬ψ))
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by (5.9), which is in turn equal to u(¬[∅]¬ψ) by the induction hypothesis and the
first part of this proof. Axiom (5) of Pn yields E
c(u)(N,Val(−, ψ)) ≤ u([N ]ψ).
To prove the converse inequality, let us assume for the sake of contradiction that
there is i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that Ec(u)(N,Val(−, ψ)) < in = u([N ]ψ). Therefore
u([N ]τi/n(ψ)) = 1, while E
c(u)(∅,Val(−,¬τi/n(ψ)) = 1 by (5.9). It follows from
this identity that u([∅]¬τi/n(ψ)) = 1 by induction hypothesis and the first part of
the proof. From axiom (7) applied with C = N and C′ = ∅ we get u([N ]
(
τi/n(ψ)∧
¬τi/n(ψ))
)
= 1; however, this is in contradiction with axiom (4) since τi/n(ψ) ∧
¬τi/n(ψ) = 0. 
5.2.2. Completeness result for Pn. In order to use the canonical model for the proof
of completeness of Pn with respect to the class of the playable Łn-models, we need
the following result.
Lemma 5.17. The canonical model of Pn is a playable Łn-frame.
Proof. Let u ∈ W c. It suffices to prove that Ec(u) is semi-playable, homogeneous,
N -maximal and regular. It is easily checked that Ec(u)(C,−) is monotonic for
every coalition C 6= N . The property of N -maximality is obtained by (5.9).
For homogeneity, let C 6= N ∈ PN and f ∈ ŁW
c
n . We will prove that for any
i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
(5.13) Ec(u)(C, f ⊕ f) ≥
i
n
if and only if Ec(u)(C, f) ⊕ Ec(u)(C, f) ≥
i
n
.
First, assume Ec(u)(C, f)⊕Ec(u)(C, f) ≥ in or, equivalently, E
c(u)(C, f) ≥ i2n .
By the definition of Ec, there is a formula ρ such that u([C]ρ) ≥ i2n and f(v) ≥
i
2n
for every v satisfying v(ρ) ≥ i2n . On the one hand, by axioms (1) and (2) of Pn and
considering φ = τ⌈i/2n⌉(ρ), we get u([C]φ) = τ⌈i/2n⌉(u([C]ρ)) = 1 ≥
i
n . On the other
hand, if v ∈ W c is such that v(φ) ≥ in , then v(φ) = 1 since φ is an idempotent
element of FPn . Therefore v(ρ) ≥
i
2n . This implies f(v) ≥
i
2n , or, equivalently,
(f ⊕ f)(v) ≥ in . We conclude that E
c(u)(C, f ⊕ f) ≥ in .
Conversely, assume Ec(u)(C, f ⊕ f) ≥ in for some i > 0. The definition of
Ec yields a formula ρ such that u([C]ρ) ≥ in and f(v) ≥
i
2n for any v ∈ W
c
with v(ρ) ≥ in . By considering φ = τi/n(ρ), we obtain on the one hand that
u([C]φ) = τi/n
(
u([C]ρ)
)
= 1 ≥ i2n . On the other hand, if v ∈ W
c is such that
v(φ) ≥ i2n , then v(φ) = 1, which means v(ρ) ≥
i
n so that f(v) ≥
i
2n . We have
proved that Ec(u)(C, f) ≥ i2n or, equivalently, E
c(u)(C, f)⊕Ec(u)(C, f) ≥ in . This
finishes the proof of (5.13).
Analogously, we can show that
Ec(u)(C, f ⊙ f) ≥
i
n
if and only if Ec(u)(C, f) ⊙ Ec(u)(C, f) ≥
i
n
.
Employing N -maximality and the first part of the proof, it is easy to prove that
for every f ∈ ŁW
c
n , we have E
c(u)(N, f ⊕ f) = Ec(u)(N, f) ⊕ Ec(u)(N, f) and
Ec(u)(N, f ⊙ f) = Ec(u)(N, f)⊙ Ec(u)(N, f). The function Ec(u) is hence homo-
geneous.
Let us prove that Ec(u) has safety for C 6= N . By way of contradiction, assume
that Ec(u)(C, 0) ≥ 1n . There is a formula φ such that u([C]φ) ≥
1
n and v(φ) = 0
for every v ∈ W c. We deduce that ⊢Pn φ → 0 and hence ⊢Pn [C]φ → [C]0 by
Monotonicity. It follows that 1n ≤ u([C]φ) ≤ u([C]0) = 0, a contradiction.
To prove that Ec(u) has liveness for every C 6= N , it suffices to consider φ = 1
in (5.8) in order to show (C, u, 1) ∈ P1.
We have to prove coalition monotonicity for C1 and C2 such that C1∩C2 = ∅ and
C1∪C2 6= N . It is enough to prove the following: if E
c(u)(C1, f1)∧E
c(u)(C2, f2) ≥
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i
n for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then E
c(u)(C1 ∪ C2, f1 ∧ f2) ≥
i
n . Let ℓ ∈ {1, 2} and
denote by φℓ a formula such that u([Cℓ]φℓ) ≥
i
n and fℓ(v) ≥
i
n , for every v satisfying
v(φℓ) ≥
i
n . Thus we can consider φ = φ1∧φ2 in (5.8) to get (C1∪C2, u, f1∧f2) ∈ Pi.
It remains to check that Ec(u) is regular. By (5.9), it suffices to prove that it
is C-regular for every C 6= N . For the sake of contradiction, assume that there
exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that ¬Ec(u)(C,¬f) < in ≤ E
c(u)(C, f). It follows that
Ec(u)(C, τi/n(f)) = 1, while E
c(u)(C, τj/n(¬f)) = 1 for
j
n = 1 −
i−1
n . By superad-
ditivity, we obtain Ec(u)(N, τi/n(f) ∧ τj/n(¬f)) = 1, which is a contradiction since
τi/n(f) ∧ τj/n(¬f) is the constant map 0. 
Theorem 5.18 (Completeness of Pn). For any φ ∈L, the following assertions are
equivalent:
(1) ⊢Pn φ.
(2) φ is true in every playable Łn-model.
(3) φ is true in every finite playable Łn-model.
(4) φ is true in every truly playable Łn-model.
Proof. The implication (1) =⇒ (2) is the content of Lemma 5.11. The equivalences
(2) ⇐⇒ (3) and (3) ⇐⇒ (4) follow from Proposition 5.7 and Lemma 5.3. Finally,
it remains to argue for the implication (2) =⇒ (1). We know by Lemma 5.17 that
Mc is a playable Łn-model. According to Proposition 5.16, M
c |= φ means that
the class of φ is equal to 1 in FPn , or, equivalently, ⊢Pn φ. 
Remark 5.19. We can use the formulas τi/n(p) to replace axioms (1) and (2) of Pn
(Definition 5.9) by a family of axioms, which are easier to understand. Indeed, put
A = {[C](p ⋆ p)↔ ([C]p ⋆ [C]p) | ⋆ ∈ {⊙,⊕}, C ∈ PN},
B = {[C]τi/n(p)↔ τi/n([C]p) | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, C ∈ PN}.
It follows from the definition of an Łn-valued playable logic that B ⊆ Pn. A careful
analysis of the proofs of Lemma 5.14, Proposition 5.16, Lemma 5.17 and Theorem
5.18 shows that we have only used the axioms in A in the form of substitutions
in formulas of B. Denote by P′n the smallest set of formulas that contains an ax-
iomatic base of Łukasiewicz (n + 1)-valued logic, the set B, the axioms (3)–(5) of
Definition 5.9, and that is closed under Modus Ponens, Uniform Substitution and
Monotonicity. It follows from the previous observation that for any φ ∈L we have
⊢P′n φ if and only if M |= φ for every playable Łn-model. Thus P
′
n = Pn.
Thus the set of axioms A can be equivalently replaced by B. Hence, the content
of axioms (1)–(2) of Pn can be rephrased as follow.
For any i ≤ n, the following two assertions are equivalent:
• The truth value of the statement ‘coalition C can enforce φ’
is at least in .
• Coalition C can enforce an outcome state in which the truth
value of φ is at least in .
5.3. Łn-valued truly playable logics for truly playable enriched Łn-frames.
Theorem 5.18 says that Pn is the logic of playable rather than truly playable effec-
tivity functions. Moreover, by Proposition 5.8 there is no axiomatization of truly
playable effectivity functions in the language L. Thus the presented many-valued
approach is a faithful generalization of the Boolean framework; see [10]. In fact the
authors of [10] go beyond this limitation in the Boolean setting by adding a new
connective to L and by enriching the neighborhood semantics with a Kripke relation.
We follow this idea by designing the modal equivalent of truly playable Łn-valued
effectivity functions.
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Let L+ be the language L∪ {[O]} where [O] is unary. The set L+ of formulas is
defined inductively from the countably infinite set Prop of propositional variables
by the following rules:
φ ::= 1 | p | φ→ φ | ¬φ | [C]φ | [O]φ
where p ∈ Prop and C ∈ PN .
In order to interpret L+-formulas, we enrich the Łn-frames with a binary relation.
Definition 5.20. A tuple F = (S,E,R) is an enriched Łn-frame if (S,E) is an
Łn-frame and R ⊆ S × S. We say that F = (S,E,R) is standard if R = {(u, v) |
E(u)(∅,¬χ{v}) = 0}.
A tuple M = (S,E,R,Val) is an enriched Łn-model (based on (S,E,R)) if
(S,E,R) is an enriched Łn-frame and Val: S × Prop → Łn. An enriched Łn-frame
F = (S,E,R) or an enriched Łn-model M = (S,E,R,Val) is called playable (truly
playable, respectively) if (S,E) is a playable (truly playable, respectively) Łn-frame.
In an enriched Łn-model, the valuation map Val is extended inductively to S×L+
by using rules (5.1) – (5.3) for the connectives 1, ¬ and →, by using rule (5.4) for
the connectives [C], where C ∈ PN , and by putting
(5.14) Val(u, [O]φ) = min{Val(v, φ) | (u, v) ∈ R}
for any φ ∈L+ and u ∈ S.
It turns out that the class of standard truly playable enriched Łn-frames can be
defined inside the class of standard playable enriched Łn-frames by an L
+-formula.
The next assertion is the Łn-valued generalization of [10, Proposition 14].
Proposition 5.21. A standard playable enriched Łn-frame F is truly playable if
and only if [∅]φ↔ [O]φ is valid in F.
Proof. First assume that F is truly playable and standard. It follows from Lemma 4.4
that F♯ := (S,E♯, R) is a standard truly playable enriched Ł1-frame. By [10, Propo-
sition 14], for every φ ∈L+ the formula [∅]φ ↔ [O]φ is valid in F
♯ and we must
prove that [∅]φ↔ [O]φ is also valid in F.
Assume that there is φ ∈L+ and a model M = (S,E,R,Val) based on F such
that Val(u, [∅]φ) < in ≤ Val(u, [O]φ) for some i ≤ n. It follows from homogeneity
of E(u) that Val(u, [∅]τi/n(φ)) = 0, while Val(u, [O]τi/n(φ)) = 1. Moreover, the
map Val(−, τi/n(φ)) has range in Ł1. Hence, any map Val
′ : S × Prop → Łn with
Val′(w, p) = Val(w, τi/n(φ)) for every w ∈ S defines an Ł1-model based on F
♯ that
falsifies [∅]p ↔ [O]p, which is the desired contradiction. We can derive a similar
contradiction in case there is some φ ∈L+ and a model M = (S,E,R,Val) based
on F such that Val(u, [∅]φ) ≥ in > Val(u, [∅]φ) for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Conversely, let F = (S,E,R) be a standard playable enriched Łn-frame in which
[∅]φ↔ [O]φ is valid for every φ ∈L+ . Then F
♯ = (S,E♯, R) is a standard playable
enriched Ł1-frame such that [∅]φ↔ [O]φ is valid for every φ ∈L+ . Since F
♯ is truly
playable by [10, Proposition 14], F is truly playable as well. 
We have to adapt the filtration technique to fit in with the newly introduced
language L+. The next definition merges Definition 5.2 with [22, Definition 5.3].
Definition 5.22. Let M = (S,E,R,Val) be an enriched Łn-model and Γ be
a set of formulas closed under subformulas and the unary connectives τ⊕ and
τ⊙. With the notation introduced in Definition 5.2, an enriched Łn-model M
∗ =
(|S|, E∗, R∗,Val∗) is a Γ-filtration of M if it satisfies (1) and (2) of Definition 5.2
and the following conditions:
(3) if (u, v) ∈ R, then (|u|, |v|) ∈ R∗,
(4) if (|u|, |v|) ∈ R∗ and u([O]φ) = 1 for every φ ∈ Γ, then v(φ) = 1.
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Lemma 5.23. Let M = (S,E,R,Val) be an enriched Łn-model and Γ be a set of
formulas closed under subformulas and the connectives τ⊕ and τ⊙. If
M |= {[O](φ ⊕ φ)↔ [O]φ⊕ [O]φ, [O](φ ⊙ φ)↔ [O]φ⊙ [O]φ}
and M∗ = (|S|, E∗, R∗,Val∗) is a Γ-filtration of M, then
(5.15) Val(u, φ) = Val∗(|u|, φ)
for every φ ∈ Γ.
Proof. The proof is a routine induction argument on the length of φ ∈ Γ. Consid-
ering the proof of Lemma 5.3, the only case we have to discuss is φ = [O]ψ ∈ Γ.
First, we note that by our assumption on M and condition (4) of Definition 5.22,
we have
(5.16) Val(u, [O]ψ) ≤ Val(v, ψ)
for every (|u|, |v|) ∈ R∗.
Let u ∈ S. Then the definition of Val∗ and the induction hypothesis yield
(5.17) Val∗(|u|, [O]ψ) = min{Val(v, ψ) | (|u|, |v|) ∈ R∗}.
The inequality Val∗(|u|, [O]ψ) ≤ Val(u, [O]ψ) holds true since (|u|, |v|) ∈ R∗ for
every (u, v) ∈ R. The other inequality is obtained by (5.16) and (5.17). 
Definition 5.24. An Łn-valued truly playable logic is a subset L of L+ that is closed
under Modus Ponens, Uniform Substitution and Monotonicity for every [C], where
C ∈ PN , and such that L contains an axiomatic base of Łukasiewicz (n+1)-valued
logic together with axioms (1)–(5) of logic Pn and the following axioms:
The additional axioms of Łn-valued truly playble logic
(6) [O]1
(7) [O]p↔ [∅]p,
(8) [∅](p→ q)→ ([∅]p→ [∅]q).
We denote by TPn the smallest Łn-valued truly playable logic.
Contrary to the Boolean case, it is not known if axiom (8) can be removed from
the axiomatization of TPn without changing TPn. Nevertheless, the following
result holds true.
Lemma 5.25. TPn is closed under the necessitation rule for [∅].
Proof. Let ⊢TPn φ. Then ⊢TPn 1 → φ and ⊢TPn [∅]1 → [∅]φ by Monotonicity,
which is equivalent to ⊢TPn [O]1 → [O]φ by axiom (7). The conclusion follows
from axiom (6) and Modus Ponens. 
We prove completeness of TPn with respect to the standard truly playable en-
riched Łn-models by the technique of the canonical model. We denote by FTPn the
Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of TPn.
Definition 5.26. The canonical model of TPn is the enriched Łn-model M =
(F,Valc) with F = (W c, Ec, Rc), where W c = MV(FTPn ,Łn), E
c and Valc are as
in Definition 5.15, and Rc is defined by
Rc = {(u, v) | ∀φ u([O]φ) = 1 =⇒ v(φ) = 1}.
Proposition 5.27 (Truth Lemma). The canonical model M = (F,Valc) of TPn
satisfies Valc(u, µ) = u(µ) for every µ ∈L+ and every u ∈W
c.
MODAL EXTENSIONS OF ŁUK. LOGIC FOR MODELING COALITIONAL POWER 19
Proof. The proof is carried out by induction on the number of connectives in µ.
The only case not considered in the proof of Proposition 5.16 is µ = [O]φ. However,
this case was considered in the proof of [13, Proposition 5.6] or in the proof of [12,
Proposition 5.5]. 
It is worth noticing that Proposition 5.27 relies on the fact that the modality [O]
is normal.
Proposition 5.28. Let µ ∈L+ and let M
∗ = (|W c|, E∗,Val∗) be an intermediate
Cl(µ)-filtration of (W c, Ec,Valc). If
R∗ = {(|u|, |v|) | ∀φ ∈ Cl(µ) u([O]φ) = 1 =⇒ v(φ) = 1},
then the model M+ = (|W c|, E+, R∗,Val∗) is a standard truly playable Cl(µ)-
filtration of the canonical model M = (W c, Ec, Rc,Valc) of TPn, where E
+ is
obtained from E∗ as in Proposition 5.7.
Proof. By Proposition 5.7 we know that M is playable. As M is finite, it is truly
playable. By Proposition 5.7 and by definition of R∗, the model M+ is a Cl(µ)-
filtration of M in the sense of Definition 5.22.
It remains to prove that M+ is standard. First, assume that u, v ∈ W c and
E+(|u|)(∅,¬χ{|v|}) = 0. It follows from the definition of E
+ and E∗ that
E(u)(∅,Val(−, φ)) = 0
for every φ ∈ Cl(µ) such that Val(v, φ) = 0. We conclude that (|u|, |v|) ∈ R∗ by
the definition of R∗.
Let E(|u|, |v|) ∈ R∗. We will prove that E+(|u|)(∅,¬χ{|v|}) = 0. By way of
contradiction, assume that there is φ ∈ Cl(µ) such that Val(v, φ) = 0 and
E(u)(∅,Val(−, φ)) =
i
n
> 0.
Since χ{|v|} is idempotent and E(u) is homogeneous, we may assume i = n. It
follows from Definition 5.20 and Proposition 5.27 that u([∅]φ) = 1. By axiom
(7) of TPn, we deduce u([O]φ) = 1. The last identity is a contradiction since
(|u|, |v|) ∈ R∗ and v(φ) = 0. 
Theorem 5.29 (Completeness of TPn). For any φ ∈L+ , the following assertions
are equivalent:
(1) ⊢TPn φ.
(2) φ is true in every standard truly playable enriched Łn-model.
(3) φ is true in every finite standard playable enriched Łn-model.
Proof. It is clear that (2) =⇒ (3). Moreover, (1) =⇒ (2) can be proved
by a straightforward induction argument. To prove (2) =⇒ (1), we obtain by
Proposition 5.28 and Proposition 5.27 that φ is true in the canonical model of TPn,
which means ⊢TPn φ. 
6. Conclusions and future research
In this paper we have studied some generalizations of Pauly’s Coalition Logic
in modal extensions of Łukasiewicz logic. Below we list some ideas for possible
applications and topics for further investigations.
(1) The gain of expressive power owing to the many-valued modal language that
is used could be exploited to encode some properties of strategic or voting
games, such as, for instance, the distribution of power among coalitions
in weighted voting games.
20 TOMÁŠ KROUPA AND BRUNO TEHEUX
(2) In modal extensions of (n + 1)-valued Łukasiewicz logics, two types of re-
lational structures can naturally be considered, giving rise to two types
of completeness results [13]. On the one hand, there is the class of frames
(structures with binary accessibility relations), while, on the other hand,
there is the class of Łn-frames. The latter are frames in which the set of al-
lowed truth values in a world is a prescribed subalgebra of Łn for every
world of the frame. Such a prescription could also be considered in the con-
text of Łn-valued (truly) playable logics, where the neighborhood semantics
replace the relational ones. The possible aim is to obtain new completeness
results with respect to this enriched semantics.
(3) We have based our generalizations of Coalition Logic on modal extensions
of Łukasiewicz logic. Other families of many-valued logics could be con-
sidered as a basis for many-valued versions of Coalition Logic. For ex-
ample, it would be interesting to compare expressive power between the
language developed in this paper and a many-valued coalitional language
based on modal extensions of Gödel logics [15].
(4) Coalition Logic is among many formal calculi developed to model the deduc-
tive aspects of games. Other systems have been considered, such as ATL
[4, 3] and its epistemic extensions [24]. A natural task could be to design
the many-valued versions of those calculi in order to capture wider classes
of games or protocols in which errors are allowed; see [22], for instance.
(5) We did not consider the complexity issue of the satisfiability problem for the
many-valued modal languages and models introduced in this paper. This
topic becomes a subject of further investigation although we conjecture that
the problem is PSPACE-hard as in the Boolean case [20], since the number
of possible truth values remains finite.
Appendix A. Representation of Boolean effectivity functions
Let N = {1, . . . , k} be a finite set of players with k ≥ 2 and S be a (possibly
infinite) set of outcomes such that |S| ≥ 2. A family B ⊆ PS that contains S
is called a structure on S. We say that B is closed under finite intersections if
X1, . . . , Xj ∈ B implies
⋂j
i=1Xi ∈ B for every j ∈ N. An effectivity function
E : PN → PPS is said to be compatible with a structure B on S if E(C) ⊆ B
for every C ∈ PN , E has liveness and safety, E(∅) = {S}, and E(N) = B \ {∅}.
An effectivity function is outcome monotonic with respect to B when the following
implication holds true for every C ∈ PN : if X ∈ E(C), X ⊆ Y and Y ∈ B, then
Y ∈ E(C).
Theorem A.1 ([21, Theorem 3.5*]). Let B be a structure on S closed under finite
intersections and E : PN → PPS be an effectivity function compatible with B.
Then the following conditions are equivalent:
(1) E is superadditive and outcome monotonic w.r.t. B.
(2) There exists a game form G = (N, {Σi | i ∈ N}, S, o) satisfying E(C) =
HG(C) ∩B for every C ∈ PN .
As announced in Section 2, we will prove that the characterization of effectiv-
ity functions generated by game forms from [10, Theorem 1] can be obtained as
a consequence of Peleg’s Theorem 3.5* in [21]. We restate the theorem for reader’s
convenience. We use the notion of true playability introduced in Definition 2.6.
Theorem A.2 ([10, Theorem 1]). Let E : PN → PPS be an effectivity function.
There exists a game form G = (N, {Σi | i ∈ N}, S, o) satisfying E = HG if and
only if E is truly playable.
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Proof. As for the first implication, it is easy to see that HG is playable. Set Z =
{z ∈ S | z = o(σN ) for some strategy profile σN}. Then Z ∈ HG(∅). Clearly, for
any set of outcomes X ⊆ S we have X ∈ HG(∅) if and only if X contains the
“range” Z . This means that HG(∅) is the principal filter generated by Z and HG
is truly playable.
In order to show the converse implication, let E be truly playable and put Z =⋂
E(∅). Since E has safety, Z 6= ∅, and since E(∅) is a principal filter, E(∅) =
{X ∈ PS | Z ⊆ X}. Consider the mapping E′ : PN → PPZ defined as follows:
X ∈ E′(C) if X ∈ E(C), for every X ∈ PZ and every C ∈ PN .
We claim that E′ is compatible with the structure PZ on Z. Indeed, it follows
that E′(∅) = {Z} and E′(C) ⊆ PZ \ {∅} for every C ∈ PN . By monotonicity,
Z ∈ E′(C) for every C ∈ PN . It remains to prove that PZ \ {∅} ⊆ E(N). Let
∅ 6= X ⊆ Z. If X = Z, then we already know that X ∈ E(N). Otherwise, X is
a nonempty proper subset of Z and thus X /∈ E(∅). We obtain by N -maximality
of E that X ∈ E(N) and by superadditivity that X ∩ Z ∈ E(N). We have proved
that the complement in Z of any nonempty proper subset of Z is in E(N), which
yields PZ \ {∅} ⊆ E(N). We can conclude that E′(N) = PZ \ {∅}.
By Theorem A.1, there is a game form G′ = (N, {Σi | i ∈ N}, Z, o) such that
E′ = HG′ . Put G = (N, {Σi | i ∈ N}, S, o). We will show that E = HG. To this
end, let C ∈ PN and X ∈ E(C). By superadditivity, X ∩ Z ∈ E(C), therefore
X ∩ Z ∈ E′(C) = HG′(C). By the definition of HG′ and HG, we get X ∈ HG(C).
For the converse inclusion HG ⊆ E, assume that X ∈ PS belongs to HG(C). By
the definition of HG, there exists σC such that o(σCσC) ∈ X∩Z for every σC . This
means X ∩ Z ∈ HG′(C) = E
′(C), which gives X ∩ Z ∈ E(C). Finally, X ∈ E(C)
follows from outcome monotonicity. 
Since every filter on a finite set is principal, the class of truly playable functions
and the class of playable functions coincide whenever the set of outcome states S
is finite.
Appendix B. Finite MV-algebras
For a general background on Łukasiewicz logic and MV-algebras see [9, 17]. In
this appendix we recall the basic notions and facts about MV-algebras that are
needed in this paper.
An MV-algebra is an algebra (A,⊕,¬, 0), where ⊕ is a binary operation, ¬ is
a unary operation and 0 is a constant, such that the following equations are satisfied:
(1) (A,⊕, 0) is an Abelian monoid,
(2) ¬(¬x) = x,
(3) ¬0⊕ x = ¬0,
(4) ¬(¬x⊕ y)⊕ y = ¬(¬y ⊕ x) ⊕ x.
We introduce the new constant 1 and two additional operations ⊙ and→ as follows:
1 = ¬0,
x⊙ y = ¬(¬x ⊕ ¬y),
x→ y = ¬x⊕ y.
We say that an MV-algebra (A,⊕,¬, 0) is finite whenever A is finite. As usual
we will say that “A is an MV-algebra” when no danger of confusion arises. For
every MV-algebra A, the binary relation ≤ on A given by
x ≤ y whenever x→ y = 1
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is a partial order. As a matter of fact, ≤ is a lattice order induced by the join ∨
and the meet ∧ operations defined by
x ∨ y = ¬(¬x ⊕ y)⊕ y,
x ∧ y = ¬(¬x ∨ ¬y),
respectively. Thus defined, the lattice reduct of A is a distributive lattice with top
element 1 and bottom element 0. If the order ≤ of A is total, then A is said to be
an MV-chain.
The algebraic semantics of finite-valued Łukasiewicz logics is given by finite MV-
chains. The standard example of a finite MV-chain is a finite Łukasiewicz chain
given by
Łn =
{
0, 1n , . . . ,
n−1
n , 1
}
, where n is a positive integer.
For every x, y ∈ Łn, put
¬x = 1− x,
x⊕ y = min(x + y, 1)
Then (Łn,⊕,¬, 0) becomes an MV-chain, where the lattice operations ∧ and ∨
are the minimum and the maximum of x, y ∈ Łn, respectively. Further derived
operations ⊙, → and ↔ on Łn are given by
x⊙ y = max(x+ y − 1, 0),
x→ y = min(1, 1− x+ y),
x↔ y = 1− |x− y|.
Observe that the choice n = 1 gives a two-element Łukasiewicz chain Ł1 = {0, 1},
in which ⊕ coincides with ∨ and ⊙ coincides with ∧. The semantics of classical
propositional logic is thus determined by Ł1. On the other hand, the algebraic
semantics of finite (n + 1)-valued Łukasiewicz logic with n ≥ 2 is given by the
variety of MV-algebrasMVn that is axiomatized by Grigolia’s axioms [11]:
(1)
⊙n
i=1 x =
⊙n+1
i=1 x,
(2)
⊕n+1
i=1
⊙m
j=1 x =
⊙n+1
i=1
⊕m
j=1
⊙m−1
k=1 x,
for every integer m ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1} that does not divide n. Moreover, it is known
that MVn is generated (as a variety) by the Łukasiewicz chain Łn.
An MV-filter (or a filter) in an MV-algebra A is a subset F ⊆ A such that
(1) 1 ∈ F ,
(2) if x, y ∈ F , then x⊙ y ∈ F ,
(3) if x ∈ F and x ≤ y ∈ A, then y ∈ F .
A principal filter in A is a filter F for which there exists x ∈ A such that F
coincides with the smallest filter containing x. If A is finite, this means simply
F = {y ∈ A | y ≥
⊙n
i=1 x} for some x ∈ A.
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